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Older employees are usually assumed to be especially “loyal” to their employers, but 
there has been little research to establish whether such attitudes have been 
changing.  This paper first conceptualizes the traditional position of older employees 
in terms of incentive contracts and employment rents, and then uses knowledge 
about recent change in the labour market to suggest that this position will have been 
deteriorating relative to younger employees.  This prediction is tested using data from 
national surveys of employees, with the main comparisons over the period 1992-
2000 and supplementary comparisons, to test robustness, for 1998-2004.  The 
results support the prediction that older employees have become relatively 
disenchanted with their situation, and show that their negative feelings are aimed at 
their own employers rather than the general employment situation.   
1  Introduction 
Age is a variable that is routinely included in most investigations of employees.  Yet it 
is rarely the focus of attention, more usually being no more than an unremarked 
control.1  There are reasons why this should change.  Most important is the 
increased longevity already witnessed, and predicted to advance further, throughout 
the advanced economies. This brings with it a rising pension and old-age welfare 
burden if the established behaviours, policies and institutions should continue 
(Esping-Andersen 1996).  As recently as the 1980s, many governments were 
encouraging early retirement to offset unemployment, but now they are generally 
trying to foster higher participation in paid employment among older workers, and are 
seeking ways of delaying the statutory age of retirement.  Age has meanwhile joined 
gender and ethnicity as a forbidden form of discrimination.  Yet for all this the 
evidence base for older worker policy has so far remained slight; this includes 
knowledge about the attitudes and motivations of older workers toward their 
employers and their employment.2   
The value of knowledge about attitudes lies in their potential for predicting behaviour.  
Fundamental theory and research by psychologists (see Fishbein and Ajzen 1975) 
has indicated that attitudinal structures are complex, and when known in full detail for 
a given behaviour, highly predictive.  There are however insurmountable practical 
difficulties in collecting sufficiently full attitudinal information in large-scale field 
studies, so as to achieve these high levels of prediction.  Instead, applied social 
researchers are limited to studying a few selected attitudes. There has accordingly 
been a search, continuing over several decades, for work-related attitudes that are 
pivotal, in the sense that (even though not highly predictive of any specific behaviour) 
they are somewhat predictive of varied types of work behaviour and also provide 
insights into attitude structures through their associations with many other kinds of 
attitudes. 
Promising candidates for pivotal status are ‘commitment attitudes’.  The Concise 
Oxford Dictionary defines commitment as ‘engagement or involvement that restricts 
freedom of action’.  Commitment is therefore, by definition, related to choice, and to 
associated opportunity costs, making commitment attitudes of direct relevance to 
participation decisions, and also rendering them conceptually tractable within socio-
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  The literature on industrial injuries and occupational ill-health is an exception to this 
generalisation, but that literature is not considered in this paper. 
2
  “[T]he organizational sciences still reflect little knowledge of older workers that can inform 
practice of how to effectively manage this changing workforce.”  Treadway et al. 2005: 879. 
economics as well as within organizational psychology, where research on 
commitment attitudes has so far been concentrated.  Additionally, the commitment 
concept when applied to social relationships (such as employment) implies a degree 
of intended long-term stability (Porter et al. 1974) that appears particularly useful for 
interpretation, prediction, and policy formation.    
In this paper, the main focus is on ‘organizational commitment’, the commitment 
attitude that has been most extensively researched to this time.  Conceptually, 
employees with a high level of commitment towards their employing organization 
make choices that serve that organization’s interests even at some opportunity cost 
to themselves.  They are less inclined to quit, they make greater efforts to avoid 
being absent from work, and they are more likely to engage in ‘citizenship 
behaviours’ –  to do helpful things that are not obligatory – and also in ‘extra-role 
behaviours’ such as those involving creativity or initiative. Evidence for these links 
with workplace behaviour comes from a large body of research on organizational 
commitment (for review see Matthieu and Zajac 1990; Riketta 2002).  Organizational 
commitment, it has been argued (e.g. Mowday et al. 1982; Matthieu and Zajac 1990) 
is potentially valuable to individuals, to employers, and to society.   
The main aims of this paper are to develop a theoretical basis for predicting changes 
in organizational commitment among older employees, and to test the derived 
hypotheses with the aid of national sample survey data. Alongside organizational 
commitment, this paper also examines change in other work-related attitudes that will 
help to clarify interpretations of change in commitment: a measure of non-financial 
employment attachment, and several measures of job satisfaction facets.   
The structure of the paper is as follows.  The next section provides an introduction to 
the concept of commitment as applied to the employment relationship.  The third 
section initially develops a theoretical position respecting the employment 
relationship, older employees, and change in employment-age relations.  In the 
second part of the third section, this theorization is used to derive hypotheses about 
change in older employees’ attitudes.  The fourth section describes the data and 
operational measures that are used to test the hypotheses.  The fifth section 
describes the analysis method and the assumptions involved, the control variables 
included in the analysis, and supplementary analysis to test robustness.  The sixth 
section presents all the results, and a discussion of the conclusions and implications 
follows in the seventh and final section. 
2  The concept of commitment 
As mentioned earlier, the general notion of commitment signifies an exclusive or 
restrictive relationship.  In the case of organizational commitment (OC), a high level 
is taken to signify some focusing of the individual’s concerns on the organization’s 
interests, to the exclusion or down-playing of other interests.  Porter et al. (1974) 
characterized OC in terms of individual identification with organizational goals and 
values, willingness to exert effort for the organization, and desire to remain in the 
organization. These authors and their colleagues were responsible for the 
development of a widely used survey instrument, the Organizational Commitment 
Questionnaire (OCQ) (see Price 1997 for details).  Table 1 shows the wording of a 
shortened form of the OCQ, developed by Lincoln and Kalleberg (1990) and adapted 
by Gallie et al. (1998); it is also used in this paper.  It takes the form of expressions of 
attitude towards the organization and towards the employee’s own behaviour in the 
organization.  Commitment (of the type outlined by Porter et al. 1974) is inferred from 
the individual’s willingness to endorse these expressions taken as a whole.  The 
operational concept is often referred to as ‘affective commitment’.3 
[Table 1 about here] 
2.1  Why commit? 
A deeper question that remains to be considered is why in the first place do people 
make commitments of various kinds, including commitments to their organization?  
As commitment is a self-imposed restriction implying opportunity costs, we need to 
understand what, in principle, is gained in return.  Two main kinds of response to this 
question have so far been offered.   
The first type of answer is that commitments are instrumental in shaping behaviour to 
achieve desired goals. Howard Becker (1960) argued that commitment can be 
characterized as a ‘side-bet’, whereby individuals increase their stake in connection 
with an activity, relationship or goal which constitutes their main bet (e.g., their 
marriage or their job).  Side-bets raise the incentive for success.  If people fall short 
after committing themselves, they lose not only their major goal, but whatever they 
have additionally put at risk in their side-bets, which in some cases could be 
something as valuable as their good reputation.  Offer (2006) suggests that 
individuals (and hence society) face a general problem of myopic choice, leading 
them into potentially disastrous short-termism: against this, they develop 
‘commitment technologies’ (such as marriage vows and insurance policies) that help 
to safeguard the long term.  Although this is not directly considered by Offer, a long-
term employment relationship (often referred to as relational or implicit contracting) 
can be read as such a commitment technology, and an employee’s commitment to 
an organization as an increased stake in the employment relationship and the long-
term gains it (hopefully) offers.  An employee who makes no commitment will be 
tempted to make choices for short-term gain (e.g., switching jobs) while losing the 
chance of larger returns in the long run. 
An alternative view is that commitments are made to whatever has intrinsic value for 
the individual.  For instance, one may commit to an organization in that it does 
something worthwhile for society, or conducts its business to high ethical standards, 
or has a congenial working atmosphere, or its management seriously cares about its 
employees’ well-being...and so on.  Pushing this approach a stage further, one can 
also argue that people have an inherent desire to make commitments, because 
commitments help to define identities. Specifically, many individuals get their identity 
through membership of social groups (Tajfel 1979).  The proviso, however, is that the 
group (organization) must be seen by the individual as worthy of esteem, if 
membership is to be accompanied by commitment and identification.  Ultimately, 
therefore, this type of explanation comes back to the values that individuals find in 
the group or organization (Anderson 1993).  Of course, instrumental theories of 
commitment, such as the side-bet theory, also rely on a value framework, as Becker 
(1960) indeed emphasized.  If commitment supports a main choice, that main choice 
itself involves an estimation of what is valuable, while the commitment may depend 
on a personal or social value attached to trustworthiness (sticking to one’s 
commitments). 
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  The label is not entirely convincing.  For  reasons that should become clearer in the 
following discussion, psychologists wanted to separate feelings towards the organization 
based on values (=affective commitment) from ‘attachment’ based on calculation.  However 
several of the items shown in Table 1 could, semantically, reflect calculative attachment as 
well as affective commitment; it is correlational structure that has led to this grouping.  
A contingency theory of the nature of the employment relationship, and hence of the 
nature of commitment-related values in organizations, was put forward by Etzioni 
(1975 [1961]).  In this, it is recognized that some organizations wield ‘normative 
power’ and are capable of eliciting ‘moral commitment’ in their employees or office-
holders.  Typically, these organizations provide public services invested with 
substantial moral significance, such as education, healthcare, or religion.  However, 
the circumstances of ‘utilitarian’ (that is, commercial) organizations means that they 
rely on ‘remunerative power’ and can only obtain a weaker ‘calculative commitment’ 
from their employees.4  Of course, many employees search actively for personal 
fulfilment in and through their work,5 even in commercial environments.  Equally, the 
employees of many socially worthy organizations in practice focus upon utilitarian 
individual aims such as job security, pay, career and pension, and so may well have 
a (largely) calculative commitment.6  UK government policy towards the public 
services has for several decades sought to re-orientate them to competitive market 
principles, and this may also increase the orientation of employees towards personal 
financial and career outcomes.   An interpretation of OC that stresses its dependence 
upon, or relationship to, utilitarian calculation, may have very wide application in 
contemporary market-dominated societies such as the UK, even though other values 
are to some extent present as well. 
2.2  Contract violation and commitment 
Whatever its basis, employees’ OC evidently requires some assumptions on the part 
of employees about what the current employment relationship offers.  What  happens 
when those assumptions turn out to be false or mistaken?  This question has been 
investigated within the framework of psychological contract theory, where it is 
referred to as contract violation or breach (Robinson and Rousseau 1994; Robinson 
1996; Coyle-Shapiro and Kessler 2000).  This research tends to show that 
employees frequently feel that employers have reneged on their promises, explicit or 
implicit, and that the general consequence is for employees with these feelings to 
reduce the level of their commitment to the organization.  OC can shrink as well as 
grow, unravel as well as entwine; commitments are not immutable.  Presumably, 
though, a committed employee will be slower to react negatively than one who is 
uncommitted, and will have a greater tolerance of an employer’s shortcomings, at 
least initially.  Cappelli (1999a) reports that even after the extensive downsizing of 
US large businesses in the 80s and 90s, employee commitment held up well, 
perhaps because employees preferred to blame job insecurity on market conditions 
rather than on their employer.  This tends to support the belief of Porter et al. (1974) 
that the greater stability of OC was a prime advantage of the concept over that of job 
satisfaction. 
3  Older employees, commitment, and change 
3.1 Theoretical perspectives 
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  Etzioni also discussed a third type of organization, with ‘coercive power’, but this is not 
relevant here. 
5
 An employee is often committed to her organization in part because it provides a convenient 
site in which to practice a fulfilling occupation; Lee et al. (2000) report a meta-analytic 
correlation of 0.45 between OC and occupational commitment.   
6
  Such tendencies are not necessarily new.  Max Weber considered that his concept of 
bureaucratic rationality, developed at the turn of the last century, applied to all types of large 
modern organizations, including established churches.  The interplay of moral and calculative 
values within the Anglican hierarchy was extensively explored in literature of the Victorian era, 
notably by Anthony Trollope. 
Concepts of labour market sorting and selection, and also of group identification 
(Tajfel 1979), suggest that employees over time tend to become increasingly 
committed to their organizations.  As Matthieu and Zajac remark, ‘… one may be 
drawn initially to an organization because of exchange relationships (i.e., calculative 
organizational commitment), yet develop attitudes consistent with maintaining 
membership’ (1990: 174).  Matthieu and Zajac also hypothesize that with longer 
periods of service, employees accumulate sunk costs and hence become more 
committed in the calculative sense.  Offering a more general economic interpretation, 
Baron and Kreps (1999: 65) envisage ‘relation-specific assets’ of varied types 
developing for both employee and employer through a long-term employment 
relationship. 
These interpretations suggest that older employees will tend to develop higher OC.  
This is supported by the extensive meta-analysis of Matthieu and Zajac (1990), who 
reported a positive correlation of 0.2 between age and OC.  Although it has been 
found that new recruits tend to have very high OC, which declines within a few years 
(Riketta 2002), this is not necessarily discordant.  OC can be high during an initial 
honeymoon period, following which those who become disappointed reduce their 
commitments and move on.  Across all Riketta’s (2002) meta-analysis studies that 
considered age as a variable, the average relationship with OC was positive and of 
virtually the same magnitude as in Matthieu and Zajac (1990).  It seems likely then 
that people over sufficient time sort themselves into jobs that suit them and so put 
themselves into position to gain progressive advantages, reflected in their supporting 
commitments.  But what exactly is the nature of advantages that may through this 
process accrue to older employees? 
Answers were provided, from partly different perspectives but with strikingly similar 
conclusions, by Edwards (1979) with his theory of ‘bureaucratic control’ and by 
Lazear (1981) with his incentive theory of ‘deferred compensation’.7  For Edwards, a 
central problem for the modern corporation was to obtain compliance from growing 
armies of administrative, technical and professional staff.  Systems of bureaucratic 
control, involving personal appraisals,8 seniority increments and privileges, and 
promotion tracks, became the general solution to this problem, and because of its 
success it was frequently extended beyond white-collar ranks to skilled manual 
employees.  One implication, illustrated with case study material by Edwards, was 
that older employees tended to be rewarded above their level of productivity, while 
younger employees received less than their current productivity would justify.   
Lazear (1981) presents a more formalized theory based on principal-agent 
contracting.  A central element is the cost of monitoring performance against 
potential shirking by employees.  Where the monitoring costs are high (as would 
often be the case with complex job requirements), any system that avoids these 
costs, while preventing shirking, provides an economic gain that can be shared 
between employer and employee.  Deferred compensation (including seniority pay 
and occupational pensions) is such a system, provided that the avoided monitoring 
cost is sufficiently high.  The younger employee is underpaid relative to effort, but 
knows that at a later time this will be compensated by rewards that exceed effort.  
She therefore has an incentive to keep in the favour of the employer until the 
deferred rewards can be obtained.  Although difficult to test empirically in a direct 
way, such evidence as has been collected is supportive of the deferred 
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  Several other economic theories make similar predictions to those of Lazear: see Kotlikoff 
and Gokhale (1992) for a brief review. 
8
  Edwards calls these ‘evaluations’ but the term ‘appraisals’ is nowadays more familiar. 
compensation theory (see especially the study by Kotlikoff and Gokhale 1992; these 
authors also review related evidence). 
These theories indicate that, under the kinds of remuneration and career systems 
that have been widely practiced in the UK as well as in the USA, older employees will 
have good reason for at least calculative commitment.  Under these circumstances, 
they should generally be working under a favourable effort-to-reward regime, and 
reaping the benefits of previous long-term commitment to their employer.  
Additionally, they may be gaining, relative to younger employees, in terms of wider 
relation-specific assets as posited by Baron and Kreps (1999).  These might include 
job protection (if for instance ‘first in last out’ applies), and good fit between job 
characteristics and personal preferences (if employees have scope to shape their 
own tasks over time, or get preference in moving into congenial jobs). 
There are however reasons for questioning whether the advantages of older 
employees have remained a reality in the changing economic and technical 
environment of ‘late capitalisms’.   A widely accepted view is that increasing market 
competition over the past two decades, as indicated for instance in rising proportions 
of international trade relative to national or world output, has led to extensive 
changes in business policies, including in regard to employment.9  In this situation 
many commentators have questioned whether long-term employment relationships 
can survive.  Conspicuous examples of employer policies have included downsizing, 
delayering (involving fewer promotion slots), outsourcing, the use of temporary or 
contract labour to replace permanent employees, and sometimes explicit statements 
that employees can no longer expect long-term jobs with the organization. What then 
becomes of deferred compensation, what becomes of older employees’ advantages, 
and what becomes of their commitment? 
To address change of this kind, Sørensen’s (2000; 2001) theory of employment 
‘rents’ is helpful.  Sørensen defined employment rents as payments above the 
market-clearing value of labour services, accruing because of insiders’ protection 
against market forces.  He linked this specifically with the existence of large 
differentials in rewards that have persisted between classes. But as markets become 
more competitive and break down insider protections, Sørensen argued that these 
rents would be squeezed out and only individual ability and effort would be rewarded, 
at its current market rate.  A partly similar argument has been advanced by Cappelli 
(1999b) in suggesting a ‘death of careers’, as businesses turn to short-term hiring to 
respond to rapidly changing opportunities and threats.   
There is evidence to show that, in the UK in the 1990s at least, the specific changes 
in employment policies predicted by Sørensen or by Cappelli did not on average take 
place.  Class differentials in rewards and benefits did not decay but became even 
more pronounced; and career structures, after some decay in the early 90s, were 
subsequently reinstated by many employers with a corresponding increase in 
promotion opportunities (McGovern et al. 2007).  Yet  Sørensen’s general argument 
may be valid even if the application to class differences was mistaken.  Class 
differences, and promotion structures to maintain membership of the higher 
occupational classes, held up because managerial and professional knowledge are 
crucial competitive assets, and arguably still more valuable in a period of rapid 
change.  At the same time, though, employers may well have seen older employees 
as a potential source of cost savings.  If according to earlier policies older employees 
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   We do not reference this perception since it is now so familiar.  For an introduction to the 
relevant literature, see for instance McGovern et al. 2007: 1-12. 
tended to be paid above their current productivity, then changes in their effort-reward 
bargain would have short-term attractions for employers.  One can object that 
(according to deferred compensation theory) the advantages of older employees 
formed part of an optimal bargain, so that to dismantle this bargain would be counter-
productive in the long run.  But in the first place, when short-term pressures 
dominate, these long-term considerations may well be set aside.  In the second 
place, moreover, the bargain is only optimal when monitoring costs are high.  But the 
advent in the 1990s of low-cost ICT-based task- and performance-monitoring for 
large proportions of employees (McGovern et al. 2007: 169-72) have made external 
control more feasible for a wide range of white-collar and service jobs: this has been 
extensively illustrated in the literature on call centres (e.g., Bain and Taylor 2000; 
Yeuk-Mui 2001; Taylor and Bain 2005).   Both considerations might lead employers 
to renege on bargains that have made older employees costly, however rational 
those bargains may have been at some earlier time.  This would affect older 
employees’ attitudes adversely, in view of the research on psychological contract 
violation. 
3.2  Hypotheses 
On the basis of the preceding discussion, the main hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis 1:  The commitment of older employees toward their organizations 
declined in the UK over the 1990s, relative to younger employees. 
To supply an interpretation of Hypothesis 1, it is also proposed: 
Hypothesis 2:  Older employees in the UK over the 1990s (henceforth, ‘older 
employees’) perceived a deterioration of their employment terms (psychological 
contract), relative to their expectations and relative to younger employees. 
There are several potential forms in which a deterioration could have been perceived 
or inferred by older employees, leading to a series of conditional elaborations of 
Hypothesis 2.  On the basis of deferred compensation theory (or incentive theory 
more generally) they could have experienced a worsening of the terms of their effort-
reward bargain, in the form of higher effort being required, or lower reward being 
offered (always in expectational and relative terms, here and hereafter).  Then: 
Hypothesis 2a:  Older employees would have become more dissatisfied with their 
work effort demands. 
Hypothesis 2b:  Older employees would have become more dissatisfied with their 
rewards via pay and benefits. 
An alternative view however would focus on declining job security (e.g., Burchell 
2002).  This deterioration, whether real or perceived, would imply a reneging not only 
on deferred compensation for older employees, but perhaps also on the overall long-
term relational contract.  In that case: 
Hypothesis 2c:  Older employees would have become more dissatisfied with their job 
security. 
If the value of a long-term employment relationship includes more congenial jobs or 
tasks, then it is also possible that these ‘relation-specific assets’ have been 
undermined through changes in work organization that are a managerial response to 
competitive pressure and uncertainty (Worrall and Cooper 2001).  More specifically, 
Gallie et al. (2001) have argued that OC has been adversely affected by a decline in 
the task discretion given to employees.  Although that research did not specifically 
consider age effects, it is possible that older employees would feel greater 
disappointment in having discretion withheld from them.  It would then follow that: 
Hypothesis 2d:  Older employees would have become more dissatisfied with the 
nature of the work that they do. 
Finally, older employees might believe that their work situation merely reflects wider 
economic or business conditions, as in the interpretation of employees’ response to 
the market squeeze put forward by Cappelli (1999a).  Then: 
Hypothesis 2e:  Older employees would have a declining attachment to employment 
as a whole, rather than (or as well as) lower OC. 
4  Data and variables 
The aim is to test the hypotheses with data that are representative of the whole 
British labour force.  This is appropriate because the changes that are imagined to 
have impacted older employees stem from general changes in the economy and in 
the technology of control. 
4.1  Data 
The main analysis uses two similar national surveys of British employees, carried out 
in 1992 and 2000/1.  The 1992 survey, known as Employment in Britain (EIB), has 
previously been reported in Gallie et al. (1998).  An aim of the 2000/1 Working in 
Britain survey (WIB) was to make comparisons with 1992 and for that purpose it 
replicated many of the questions contained in the earlier survey including those used 
for the present analysis.  The data and documentation of both surveys are accessible 
to the academic community through the UK Data Archive (www.data-archive.ac.uk). 
The two surveys provide cross-sectional national samples, obtained by a stratified 
random sample of private addresses with further random selection of one employed 
respondent per address.  The achieved samples were 3458 employees in 1992 (71 
per cent response rate) and 2132 in 2000/1 (65 per cent response rate), and the age 
range in both surveys was 20-60.  Information in both surveys was collected from 
respondents by means of a personal interview in the home, using a structured 
questionnaire, supplemented by a self-completion form.  Weights were constructed 
for both surveys in a similar manner, to correct for survey design and non-response. 
Additional data from two other national surveys, the Workplace 
Employee/Employment Surveys of 1998 and 2004, were used for a sensitivity test; 
these data sources will be briefly described in section 5.3. 
4.2  Variables 
The main dependent variable was a measure of OC as shown in the first column of 
Table 1.  The OC measure was a summation of the six items: with each item scored 
from 1 (least favourable attitude) to 4 (most favourable), the summative scale has a 
range of 6-24.  Listwise deletion of cases was applied where there was no response 
or the response was ‘Don’t know’.  The reliability of the scale items (Cronbach alpha) 
was 0.79 in each survey.  In a variety of exploratory principal components analysis 
and factor analysis studies,10 the six items were always indicated as a distinct factor. 
Referring to Hypotheses 2a-2d, six facet satisfaction items were analysed, and the 
wording of these is shown in Table 2.  The items had a seven-point response scale 
and were scored with dissatisfaction high.  The concept of ‘dissatisfaction with work 
demands’ was measured by summing two of these facets, one relating to hours of 
work and the other to the amount of work, so that the scale had values of 2-14.  
Similarly, ‘dissatisfaction with pay and benefits’ was measured by summing the 
separate items relating to pay and to fringe benefits.  ‘Dissatisfaction with job 
security’ and ‘dissatisfaction with the work itself’ were each measured through a 
single satisfaction item with values 1-7. 
[Table 2 about here] 
There was a slight variation in the labelling of two of the response scale points, 
between the 1992 and 2000/1 surveys (see notes to Table 2).  This variation could 
affect the mean or dispersion of the items.  However, as will become apparent in 
section 5, the analysis method can reasonably be assumed to eliminate most or all of 
the mean bias that might result from this wording artefact.  Also, the cross-survey 
item variances are not heterogeneous to a significant degree. 
The final measure used as a dependent variable, relating to Hypothesis 2e, can be 
labelled ‘non-financial employment attachment’ (EA).  Deriving from Warr (1982), its 
wording in both surveys was as follows: ‘If you were to get enough money to live as 
comfortably as you would like for the rest of your life, would you continue to work, not 
necessarily in your present job, or would you stop working?’.  The ‘continue to work’ 
option was scored 1 while ‘stop working’ and ‘don’t know’ were scored zero.  Note 
that the wording makes the continued employment option independent of the present 
employer, and so distances it from OC.  Whereas OC is positively correlated with age 
(see section 2), EA is negatively related to age (Gallie et al. 1998). 
The explanatory variables are time period and age group.  The survey dates define 
two time periods, 1992 and 2000/1.  The 1990s were, as noted earlier, a period of 
intensifying international competition and of technological and market change, and it 
is these factors that are hypothesized to drive a relative decline in the employment 
situation of older employees.  To test the hypotheses, two age groups are defined: 
‘younger’=20-44, and ‘older’=45-60.  As a sensitivity test, an alternative cut (20-49 v. 
50-59) will also be considered (see section 5.3).   
Control variables are described in section 5. 
5  Analysis 
5.1  The ‘difference in differences’ model 
The hypotheses have the form of a change over time for older employees relative to 
younger employees.  Tests of the hypotheses use the analytical model known as 
‘difference in differences’ (DiD).  In the regression setting, this features an interaction 
of time period with group, where (by hypothesis) groups are differentially affected by 
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  These analyses included: the six items alone; inclusion of an additional two items from the 
OCQ (in the 1992 survey data only); the six items together with 15 facet satisfaction items. 
some change or influence that is correlated with time period.  With two time periods 
and two groups, this gives rise to the standard equation for individual i: 
Yi=β0 + β1age1i + β2time1i + δ1age1i*time1i + ui  (1) 
where Y is the outcome and age and time are dummies with subscripts (0,1).  The 
coefficient on the interaction term, δ1, estimates the effect of interest for hypotheses 
of the DiD type.  The interaction coefficient is equivalent to the mean between-group 
difference across different times, or the mean between-time difference across 
different groups, as shown below: 
 δ1 ≡ (Ya1,t1-Ya1,t0) – (Ya0,t1-Ya0,t0)   (2a) 
     ≡ (Ya1,t1-Ya0,t1) – (Ya1,t0-Ya0,t0)   (2b) 
where the subscripted Ys are (age x time) subgroups’ mean outcomes.  Further 
elucidation of DiD is provided by Heckman and Robb (1985) and Abadie (2005). 
The advantage offered by the DiD analysis design is that it removes unobserved 
differences between the two groups to the extent that these are constant over time, 
and differences between time periods to the extent that these are constant between 
groups.  The latter is particularly useful in the present case.  Since 1992 witnessed 
an economic recession, while in 2000 the economy and labour market were buoyant, 
any absolute change in the commitment levels of older employees across the two 
years could be interpreted as part of a general shift in attitudes across the populace 
rather than something specifically related to age.  By making the comparison relative 
to younger employees, one can reasonably expect to eliminate population-wide shifts 
in attitudes that result from economic circumstances to which all are exposed.   
The main difficulty with the DiD method is its interpretive assumption.  We wish to 
interpret a differential effect of time period on older employees in terms of a 
withdrawal of favourable treatment by employers over the period in question.  This 
involves the strong assumption that there are no other changes in the relative 
position of older employees over the same period.  Of course, this assumption is not 
testable since an infinite number of other changes might be imagined.  It is for this 
reason that Hypotheses 2a-d are important: they provide more specific 
interpretations of older employees’ experiences which, if consistent with observed 
changes in OC, strengthen the evidence in favour of the main hypothesis.  
Hypotheses 2a and 2b are most clearly linked to the deferred compensation view of 
older employees’ commitment.  Hypotheses 2c-e provide other viewpoints that 
overlap with but are partly different from the deferred compensation viewpoints.  
Accordingly, if the evidence supports any of 2c-e but supports neither 2a nor 2b, this 
would undermine an interpretation in terms of deferred compensation even if the 
evidence also supports Hypothesis 1. 
A further requirement is to control for relevant changes in the composition of the 
groups that are to be compared.  In the present case, the years 1992 and 2000 had 
large differences in unemployment.  Remaining in employment under the adverse 
conditions of 1992 might have needed a higher level of commitment than in the tight 
labour market of 2000.  This could have particularly affected older people since an 
alternative status such as retired or incapacitated would be more available to them 
than to younger people.  Accordingly, the analysis should include controls for the 
variables that are believed to affect participation in employment. 
5.2 Analysis specifications  
Three specifications were estimated, each separately for female and male 
employees, allowing all estimates to vary freely by gender. 
- The first specification contained only an intercept and the interaction between age 
group and time period, providing a baseline against which inclusion of controls could 
be compared.  
-The second specification contained a set of variables likely to affect participation.  
The individual’s earning capacity was represented by highest educational 
qualification,11 and occupational class12 (the latter was deemed a more reliable and 
comprehensive indicator of acquired skills than vocational qualifications).  To indicate 
other household income, a variable was constructed from questions about whether 
the respondent had a partner, whether the partner was employed, and if employed 
whether in a higher occupation (managerial/professional, associate professional, or 
administrative).  Additionally, to represent  childcare costs, the age group of the 
youngest dependent child (under 5, 5-11, or 12-16) was included, with no dependent 
child as the reference category. 
- The third specification extended the second by also including dummies for whether 
the individual had been unemployed long-term (six months or more), or short-term 
(less than six months), within the previous five years.  It also included a dummy for 
long-term illness or disability.   
Specification 2 is regarded as the main specification, with specifications 1 and 3 
being provided to assess the stability of the estimates.  The additional variables of 
specification 3 might be considered endogenous (for instance, OC might affect 
chances of being dismissed or otherwise becoming unemployed; and people 
continuing in paid work despite illness might have particularly high OC).  For that 
reason these variables would not be suitable for inclusion in a main specification.  
Their addition does however provide a reasonably strong test of stability.     
5.3  Supplementary analyses to assess sensitivity 
If shifts in OC among older employees relate to changes in the operation of long-term 
relational contracts (as exemplified in deferred compensation), then these shifts in 
OC should become more marked as employees approach nearer to the age of 
retirement.  To assess this supplementary hypothesis, the analyses were re-run with 
the age groups redefined to be 20-49 and 50-60 instead of 20-44 and 45-60.  There 
were too few young children in the families of the 50-60 age group to maintain the 
‘age group of youngest child’ variable in this supplementary analysis.  It was replaced 
by a dummy for presence of any child under 16 in the household.  Other control 
variables were unchanged. 
Another issue is whether younger employees were more capable of exploiting 
opportunities that came from the improvement in the economy and business 
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  There were four categories: degree, A or AS level or Scottish equivalent, O-level or 
(various) equivalents, and lower than O-level.  Qualifications lower than O-level equivalent, 
and no qualification, were combined, since there were differences in the separate proportions 
across surveys that possibly resulted from response artefact.  Once combined, the across-
survey proportions were similar. 
12
  The NSSEC classification was used, with six classes. 
conditions between 1992 and 2000. If so, could this lead to a divergence in attitudes 
between younger and older groups?  To assess this, we ran analyses of OC with 
data from national surveys of employees carried out in 1998 and 2004.  These dates 
both fall within a long period of economic and growth and stability and the over-time 
comparisons are therefore unaffected by recovery from the recession of the early 
90s.  If the age group by time period effect is present in 1992-2000 but disappears in 
1998-2004, then the business cycle is likely to provide the key.  If however there is a 
similar effect in both analyses, then the result requires a more fundamental 
explanation such as provided in section 3.  
The 1998 Workplace Employee Relations Survey and the 2004 Workplace 
Employment Relations Survey each offer more than 20,000 employees for analysis.   
There are numerous differences between WERS98/04 and the EIB and WIB surveys, 
and a full description of the WERS data will be deferred to a later paper (many details 
can be found in Cully et al. 1999; Kersley et al. 2006).  In brief, we note that (1) the 
OC measure is based on three items that correspond to a subset of the Lincoln-
Kalleberg items – see the right-hand column of Table 1; (2) employees in workplaces 
with less than 10 employees are not covered in the sample; (3) the age groups for 
the analysis are limited to below 50 and 50-plus (a continuous age measure is not 
available); (4) the control variables are similar to those used for the main 
specification (Model 2) of EIB/WIB, except that partner’s occupation is not available 
and the 1-digit Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) is used in place of 
NSSEC-class.  Intra-workplace clustering is dealt with by means of the robust 
variance estimator, which is also used in all the EIB/WIB analyses.13   
6  Results 
This section starts with the results of the main analyses, with older employees 
defined as 45-60.  This is followed by a brief account of the results of the variant 
analyses with older employees defined as 50-60.  Finally the results using the 
WERS98/04 data are also summarised. 
6.1  Main analyses  
In Table 3, the chief results relating to Hypothesis 1 are presented.  These are the 
interaction effects of age group and time period (survey) on OC (for full model results 
for models 2 and 3, see Appendix Table). For both men and women, and for each of 
three specifications analysed, older employees shifted in 2000 toward lower OC, 
relative to younger employees.  These effects were in all specifications significant at 
least at the five per cent significance level.  The estimates were little affected by 
changes in the specification.  These results therefore provide strong evidence in 
support of Hypothesis 1.  The results also provide several points of detail that are of 
value for further interpretation.  In 1992, older employees had higher levels of OC 
than younger employees, consistent with previous literature.  By 2000, both younger 
and older groups on average had shifted toward lower OC.  However, the shift was 
considerably greater in the case of older employees, so that by 2000 there was no 
appreciable difference by age group. 
[Table 3 about here] 
                                                 
13
  Alternative OLS specifications with additional variables available in WERS, and also 
models with workplace fixed effects, have been estimated besides those reported here.  It is 
hoped to report these results in a subsequent paper. 
Table 4 shows (in abbreviated form) the main results relating to employee  
dissatisfaction with various facets of their employment (Hypotheses 2a-2d).   All 
coefficient estimates on the age group by time period interaction had positive sign 
(older employees tended to become relatively more dissatisfied over time).  However 
the significance of these interaction effects varied, as follows. 
Hypothesis 2a:  Older employees became significantly more dissatisfied with the 
demands of their work (hours and work amount), relative to younger employees.  The 
significance level was 1 per cent in the case of female employees and 10 per cent in 
the case of male employees (see also section 6.2).14 
Hypothesis 2b:  The difference over time between older and younger employees in 
regard to pay and benefits was not statistically significant for either female or male 
employees. 
Hypothesis 2c:  The difference over time between older and younger employees in 
regard to job security was not statistically significant for either female or male 
employees. 
Hypothesis 2d:  Older female employees became significantly more dissatisfied with 
the work itself than did younger female employees.  The corresponding effect in the 
case of men was statistically non-significant. 
[Table 4 about here] 
Overall, these results provide support for the view that older employees’ 
dissatisfaction was particularly concentrated in the area of work demands (hours and 
amount of work).  This is consistent with an interpretation of falling OC in terms of a 
deteriorating effort-reward bargain through higher than expected effort requirements.  
To explore this result further, separate analyses were also conducted for 
dissatisfaction with hours and dissatisfaction with the amount of work.  For 
dissatisfaction with hours, the relevant effect was significant at the 5 per cent level for 
older male employees and at the 10 per cent level for older female employees, while 
for dissatisfaction with amount of work, the effect was significant at the 1 per cent 
level for older female employees, but non-significant for older male employees. 15  It 
appears then that both genders of older employees have experienced growing 
relative dissatisfaction about work demands, but this dissatisfaction is focused on 
partly different features of work demands by women and men.  This difference in 
expression can be further interpreted by considering the different distributions of paid 
hours by gender, and of unpaid hours of housework by gender, that prevail in Britain 
(e.g., see Crompton 1999; Gershuny 2000). 
There was no evidence that older employees were becoming relatively more 
dissatisfied with pay and benefits, nor job security.  The significant relative increase 
in dissatisfaction with the nature of work among older female employees also cannot 
be considered evidence of a relative deterioration in task discretion (or other intrinsic 
characteristics of work tasks) for older employees, for there is no reason why this 
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  The joint probability that these results arose by chance, bearing in mind that four separate 
analyses were run for each gender and that the results come in pairs, is less than 0.02. 
15
  The estimated coefficients (standard errors) from Model 2 were as follows: dissatisfaction 
with hours, older female interaction 0.221 (0.12), older male interaction 0.327 (0.13); 
dissatisfaction with amount of work, older female interaction 0.306 (0.11), older male 
interaction 0.125 (0.16). 
should not also apply to older male employees, given that educational qualifications 
and occupational class are controlled in models (2) and (3).  A gender-specific 
interpretation would be required, but this lies beyond the scope of the present paper. 
Table 5 presents the key results from the analysis of non-financial employment 
attachment (EA), which refers to Hypothesis 2e.  This analysis had a binary 
dependent variable, and the table shows the estimated marginal effects, evaluated at 
mean values, for probit models. These effects can be interpreted as changes in the 
probability of expressing a positive EA, for a unit change in the explanatory variable. 
[Table 5 about here] 
Older female employees became relatively more attached to employment over the 
period, compared with younger females.  In the case of older male employees, 
though signs were negative, the estimates were near-zero and non-significant.  
Apparently, then, the increasing disaffection indicated by the decline in OC did not 
also reflect a declining desire to participate in employment.   
6.2  Changing the age cut from 45 to 50 
The variant analyses in which ‘older’ employees were defined as those aged 50-60 
generally confirm the picture from the main results.  Table 6a abstracts the key 
results concerning OC, and Table 6b does the same for dissatisfaction with work 
demands: in each case, the estimates with the age cut-off at 50 is compared with the 
corresponding result with the age cut-off at 45.   
[Table 6 about here] 
It can be seen that older employees’ OC becomes still more negative when the age 
cut-off is shifted to 50, and the estimated effects for older female employees are now 
significant at the 1 per cent level whereas they were at the 5 per cent level in the 
main analysis.  Similarly, dissatisfaction with work demands becomes greater, and 
the estimated effects for older male employees are now significant at the 5 per cent 
level whereas they were at the 10 per cent level in the main analysis.  These results 
are consistent with the prediction that a decline in the relative employment conditions 
for older employees would be expressed more strongly in samples closer to 
retirement. 
The variant analyses for dissatisfaction with financial reward (pay and benefits), 
dissatisfaction with job security, and dissatisfaction with the work itself, produced no 
significant changes: the age group by time period effects remained non-significant at 
the 10 per cent level.  The key estimates for the Model 2 specification only are 
summarized in Table 7. 
[Table 7 about here] 
6.3  Summary OC results from WERS98/04 
A range of variant analyses has been carried out with the WERS data, but here only 
one such analysis is presented, since all analyses produced a qualitatively similar 
picture.16  Table 8 presents the full interaction effects on OC for a specification with 
control variables that are as near as possible to those used in the main analysis (see 
model 2 in Table 3).  It shows that employees aged 50 and over, whether female or 
male, shifted towards lower relative levels of OC from 1998 to 2004.  This interaction 
effect was significant at the 5 per cent level for both women and men.  Other details 
of the table show that employees aged below 50 increased their level of OC over the 
1998-2004 period (this was in contrast with the 1992-2000 analysis), and that older 
employees started in 1998 at a relatively high level of OC, but their level fell over the 
period, eliminating most (for women) or all (for men) of the age differential by 2004.   
[Table 8 about here] 
The magnitude of the effects cannot be compared in any rigorous manner with those 
from the 1992-2000 analysis.  Apart from differences in sample and in analysis 
specifications, the OC measures are not the same, and have a different distribution.  
For instance, the weighted mean level of OC in the WERS 1998 employee sample 
was 10.62, while the corresponding mean for the EIB 1992 data was 15.95.  The 
significance levels (t-statistics) also are not strictly comparable, because WERS has 
much larger samples but this is offset by far more extreme weighting because of the 
sampling design.  None the less, the qualitative similarity between the main analyses 
and the WERS variants is striking. 
7  Conclusions and implications 
The research presented in this paper has used theories about organizational 
commitment (OC), about the relative treatment of older employees, and about 
competitive pressure on employment rents, to derive a main hypothesis about 
decline in relative OC among older employees over recent years.  Using national 
survey data, the analysis has supported the main hypothesis by providing strong 
evidence of a greater fall in OC among older employees, than among younger 
employees, over the 1992-2000 period.  This evidence is robust to variation in model 
specification and in choice of cut-off between age groups.  It has also been extended 
by an analysis of alternative datasets for the 1998-2004 period, which yielded 
qualitatively similar findings concerning OC; this eliminated a competing explanation 
concerning possible age-related effects of the business cycle.  In the terms of the 
theoretical discussion, the results of the OC analysis suggest that ‘seniority rents’ 
have been falling, leading to a sense among older employees that their relational 
contract has been breached.   
The analysis of the 1992-2000 datasets also covered several facets of job 
dissatisfaction that might provide further interpretive insight into the OC findings.  It 
appears that older employees do not tend to feel that their financial expectations 
have been undermined, but do tend to feel that greater work demands are being 
made of them than they regard as due at their stage of the work-life cycle.  Increases 
in work intensity and in long hours have been widely reported over the past two 
decades (e.g., Nichols 1991; Gallie et al. 1998; Green 2001; 2006; McGovern et al. 
2007).  This, we suggest, conflicts with the implicit effort-reward bargain of the 
deferred compensation type. Interpretation in terms of implicit contracts and deferred 
compensation is also strengthened by the lack of support for the partially competing 
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   The variants included: different sets of control variables; unweighted instead of weighted 
analyses; workplace fixed effects models, and workplace population-averaged (weighted) 
models. 
hypotheses concerning job insecurity, intrinsic nature of work, and general 
disaffection with employment.   
From a policy viewpoint, the reassuring part of the findings is that older employees 
are not expressing a declining attachment to remaining in the labour market, and in 
the case of older female employees, attachment to employment has even been 
increasing.  However, one can assume that for most older employees the practical 
way to stay employed is to remain with the existing employer, and declining OC 
signals a weakening of the desire to remain.  Furthermore, employers themselves 
may feel that older employees are of less value if their commitment falls, and if they 
react negatively to demands for increased work effort.  The bond between older 
employee and employer therefore seems likely to be weakening on both sides.  Of 
course, it is possible that future cohorts entering the late stages of their careers will 
have different expectations, and so these findings may not be predictive for the long 
term.  This however is a risky assumption since if it fails, older employees’ attitudes 
may become increasingly negative, with adverse implications for retaining them in 
employment.  More constructively, initiatives for work-life balance reform should take 
more account of older employees. 
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Table 1  Questions on organizational commitment (OC) 
Adapted Lincoln & Kalleberg OC scale 
used in EIB 1992 and WIB 2000* 
WERS 1998 and WERS 2004 OC scale 
I find that my values and the 
organization’s values are quite similar 
I share many of the values of my 
organization 
I feel very little loyalty to this organization I feel loyal to my organization 
I am proud to be working for this 
organization 
I am proud to tell people who I work for 
I am willing to work harder than I have to 
in order to help this organization succeed 
I would take almost any job to keep 
working for this organization 
I would turn down another job with more 
pay in order to stay with this organization 
 
* See Gallie et al. 1998: 237-8; Price 1997.   
Table 2  Questions on facets of job satisfaction used in EIB and WIB 
Question introduction: ‘I’m going to read out a list of various aspects of jobs, and for 
each one I’d like you to tell me, from this [response] card, which number best 
describes how satisfied or dissatisfied you are with that particular aspect of your own 
present job.’ 
Label Wording 
Work effort demands The hours you work 
 The amount of work 
Rewards Your pay 
 Fringe benefits 
Job security Your job security 
Work itself The work itself 
Note: Responses in EIB 1992 were labelled ‘completely satisfied, very satisfied, fairly 
satisfied, neither satisfied nor dissatisfied, fairly dissatisfied, very dissatisfied, completely 
dissatisfied’ with associated response numbers 1-7.  The responses in WIB 2000 were the 
same except that ‘fairly’ was dropped before ‘satisfied’ and ‘dissatisfied’. 
 
Table 3  OLS estimates of age group by year interaction effects on OC in 
pooled EIB 1992 and WIB 2000 data 
Model (see 
note) 
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
 female sub-population male sub-population 
 coefficient estimates (robust standard errors below) 
over 44 0.8858 0.7719 0.7368 1.0265 0.8283 0.8539 
 (0.2181)** (0.2276)** (0.2277)** (0.2475)** (0.2465)** (0.2468)** 
wib 2000 -1.0769 -1.0397 -0.9792 -1.1275 -1.0653 -1.0694 
 (0.1500)** (0.1499)** (0.1513)** (0.1578)** (0.1541)** (0.1527)** 
over 44 & wib -0.6713 -0.6851 -0.7029 -0.9258 -0.8755 -0.8828 
 (0.2720)* (0.2729)* (0.2717)* (0.3029)** (0.2894)** (0.2871)** 
Constant 15.6824 15.0423 15.0964 15.6425 15.7904 15.8341 
 (0.1164)** (0.3158)** (0.3153)** (0.1209)** (0.2270)** (0.2343)** 
Observations 2241 2241 2241 2301 2301 2301 
R-squared 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.10 0.10 
Significance: * significant at 5 per cent level ** significant at 1 per cent level. 
Note on model specifications: (1) no controls (2) controls are highest qualification (4 
categories – degree, A-level/equiv.,O-level/equiv.,below/none); NSSEC class (6 categories); 
partner (4 categories – no partner, partner not employed, partner employed in lower 
occupation, partner employed in higher occupation); age of youngest child (4 categories – no 
child,0-4,5-11,12-16) (3) controls as model (2) plus dummies for long-term (6 months) 
unemployment in last 5 years; short-term unemployment in last 5 years; long-term (persistent) 
illness.  See Appendix Table for full results for Model (2). 
Table 4  OLS estimates of age group by year interaction effects on facet 
dissatisfactions in pooled EIB 1992 and WIB 2000 data 
Model (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
 female sub-population male sub-population 
 coefficient estimates (robust standard errors below) 
Dissatisfaction with work effort demands (hours & amount of work) 
0.5403 0.5255 0.5372 0.4866 0.4500 0.4473 over 44 & 
wib (0.1997)** (0.1990)** (0.1968)** (0.2541)+ (0.2523)+ (0.2528)+ 
Na 2239 2239 2239 2291 2291 2291 
Dissatisfaction with reward (pay & fringe benefits) 
0.1736 0.1868 0.1784 0.1778 0.1853 0.2006 over 44 & 
wib (0.2413) (0.2383) (0.2374) (0.3036) (0.2800) (0.2809) 
Na 2166 2166 2166 2268 2268 2268 
Dissatisfaction with job security 
0.1840 0.1882 0.1928 0.1671 0.1391 0.1474 over 44 & 
wib (0.1290) (0.1291) (0.1289) (0.1699) (0.1629) (0.1636) 
Na 2238 2238 2238 2295 2295 2295 
Dissatisfaction with the work itself 
0.2035 0.2054 0.2254 0.0711 0.0642 0.0628 over 44 & 
wib (0.1042)+ (0.1033)* (0.1011)* (0.1223) (0.1208) (0.1205) 
Na 2239 2239 2239 2292 2292 2292 
a : Ns are constrained to exclude cases missing in the analysis of OC. 
Significance: + significant at 10 per cent level * significant at 5 per cent level  
** significant at 1 per cent level. 
For model specifications (1)-(3), see note to Table 3. 
Table 5  Probit estimates of age group by year interaction effects on non-
financial employment attachment (EA), in pooled EIB 1992 and WIB 2000 data 
Model (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
 female sub-population male sub-population 
 estimated marginal effectsb (standard errors below) 
0.1202 0.1268 0.1279 -0.0493 -0.0559 -0.0538 over 44 & 
wib (0.0424)** (0.0430)** (0.0432)** (0.0516) (0.0532) (o.0532) 
Na 2241 2241 2241 2301 2301 2301 
a: Ns are constrained to exclude cases missing in the analysis of OC. 
b: evaluated at the means. 
Significance: ** significant at 1 per cent level. 
For model specifications (1)-(3), see note to Table 3. 
Table 6  Comparison of age group by year interaction effects for different 
definitions of age group 
(a)  OLS estimates of coefficients (robust standard errors) for interaction effects on OC 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
 female sub-population male sub-population 
-0.6713 -0.6851 -0.7029 -0.9258 -0.8755 -0.8828 over 44 & wib 
(0.2720)* (0.2729)* (0.2717)* (0.3029)** (0.2894)** (0.2871)** 
-0.8699 -0.8727 -0.9132 -1.2811 -1.2262 -1.2451 over 49 & wib 
(0.3302)** (0.3330)** (0.3332)** (0.3967)** (0.3878)** (0.3859)** 
(b)  OLS estimates of coefficients (robust standard errors) for interaction effects on 
dissatisfaction with work demands  
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
 female sub-population male sub-population 
0.5403 0.5255 0.5372 0.4866 0.4500 0.4473 over 44 & wib 
(0.1997)** (0.1990)** (0.1968)** (0.2541)+ (0.2523)+ (0.2528)+ 
0.6424 0.6618 0.6900 0.6188 0.6011 0.6019 over 49 & wib 
(0.2403)** (0.2373)** (0.2376)** (0.2757)* (0.2749)* (0.2749)* 
Ns are as shown in Tables 3 and 4. 
Significance: + significant at 10 per cent level * significant at 5 per cent level  
** significant at 1 per cent level. 
For model specifications (1)-(3), see note to Table 3. 
Table 7 OLS estimates of coefficients (robust standard errors) for interaction 
effects on other dissatisfaction measures, with older age group defined as 50-
60 
financial reward job security work itself Model 2 
controls female male female male female male 
0.4253 0.3947 0.1632 0.2496 0.2050 0.1238 over 49 & 
wib (0.3033) (0.2955) (0.1555) (0.1771) (0.1134) (0.1396) 
Ns are as shown in Table 4. 
For model specifications (2), see note to Table 3. 
Table 8  WERS 1998 and 2004: OLS estimates of effects (robust standard 
errors) on OC of age group by time period interaction 
 female sub-population male sub-population 
wers 2004 0.2394 0.1984 
 (0.0961)* (0.1125) 
over49 0.6245 0.4084 
 (0.1130)** (0.1198)** 
wers 2004 & over49 -0.4772 -0.4305 
 (0.1842)** (0.2087)* 
N 21508 19950 
Significance: * significant at 5 per cent level ** significant at 1 per cent level. 
Note: Controls are highest qualification (5 categories: none, below O-level/equiv.,O-
level/equiv.,A-level/equiv.,degree), occupation (SOC: 9 categories), partner (dummy), age of 
youngest child (4 categories: no child,0-4,5-11,12-18). 
Appendix Table  Analysis of OC using pooled EIB 1992 and WIB 2000 data: full 
results for models with controls 
Model (2) (3) (2) (3) 
 female sub-population male sub-population 
 coefficient estimates (robust standard errors) 
over 44 0.7719 0.7368 0.8283 0.8539 
 (0.2276)** (0.2277)** (0.2465)** (0.2468)** 
wib -1.0397 -0.9792 -1.0653 -1.0694 
 (0.1499)** (0.1513)** (0.1541)** (0.1527)** 
over 44 & wib -0.6851 -0.7029 -0.8755 -0.8828 
 (0.2729)* (0.2717)* (0.2894)** (0.2871)** 
0.2563 0.2773 0.1956 0.1866 lower manager/professional 
(0.3118) (0.3107) (0.2038) (0.2044) 
0.5610 0.6123 -0.1031 -0.1025 administrative 
(0.3248) (0.3232) (0.2169) (0.2170) 
0.6174 0.6671 -0.6973 -0.6928 supervisory/technician 
(0.3938) (0.3920) (0.2169)** (0.2192)** 
0.5871 0.6757 -1.1068 -1.1090 skilled   
(0.3393) (0.3363)* (0.2551)** (0.2554)** 
-0.0976 -0.0136 -1.3297 -1.2917 routine 
(0.3719) (0.3712) (0.2958)** (0.3005)** 
0.3224 0.3103 0.2232 0.2344 A-level/equiv. 
(0.2439) (0.2390) (0.2134) (0.2130) 
0.0854 0.0700 0.1113 0.1395 O-level/equiv. 
(0.2469) (0.2431) (0.2293) (0.2288) 
0.2218 0.2041 0.5885 0.6039 Below O/equiv. or none 
(0.2708) (0.2657) (0.2466)* (0.2472)* 
0.1371 0.1092 0.2590 0.2607 partner, not employed 
(0.2693) (0.2685) (0.2203) (0.2198) 
0.0933 0.0360 0.0109 0.0144 partner, lower occupation 
(0.1724) (0.1724) (0.1907) (0.1909) 
0.4438 0.4144 -0.1509 -0.1592 partner, higher occupation 
(0.2024)* (0.2003)* (0.2387) (0.2384) 
-0.2815 -0.2530 0.0976 0.0814 youngest child 0-4 
(0.2105) (0.2083) (0.2107) (0.2103) 
-0.0419 -0.0410 -0.1839 -0.1932 youngest child 5-11 
(0.1692) (0.1697) (0.2049) (0.2047) 
0.0703 0.0377 0.2212 0.2288 youngest child 12-16 
(0.1952) (0.1945) (0.2664) (0.2655) 
 -0.5597  -0.2249 unemployed 6+ months in 
last 5 years 
 (0.2243)*  (0.2359) 
 -0.5747  0.0416 unemployed <6 months in 
last 5 years 
 (0.3244)  (0.2335) 
 0.0200  -0.4569 long-term illness or disability 
 (0.2141)  (0.2134)* 
Constant 15.0423 15.0964 15.7904 15.8341 
 (0.3158)** (0.3153)** (0.2270)** (0.2343)** 
Observations 2241 2241 2301 2301 
R-squared 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.10 
Significance: + significant at 10 per cent level * significant at 5 per cent level  
** significant at 1 per cent level. 
